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Canadian Naval IntelHgence 
David Stafford 
Michael Hadley and Roger Sarty. Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian naval 
forces and German sea-raiders 1880-1918. Montreal: MeGill-Queen's 
University Press 1991. 
0 ccasionally a book comes your way that in the normal course of events you would 
ignore. Not because it was unworthy, but 
because it was not in your direct field of 
interest and, after all, there are only so many 
hours a week you can read. Then, by some 
chance, you open the cover and glance at a 
page. Before you know what is happening, you 
are hooked, and as a bonus it turns out to be 
not so marginal as you thought. 
This happened to me recently with Tin-Pots 
and Pirate Ships: Canadian navalforces and 
German sea-raiders 1880-1918, by Michael 
Hadley and Roger Sarly. It contains a chapter 
on Canadian Intelligence and Patrols, and 
naturally enough that was what I turned to 
first. What I learned about was a fascinating 
episode in the history of Canadian intelligence. 
In August 1909, the Imperial Defence 
Conference in London came up with yet another 
of its ideas for squaring the circle of Colonial 
and Imperial naval policy. This, as everyone 
knows, and as Hadley and Sarty carefully 
analyse, had for years been a bone of contention 
in Canadian domestic politics, as well as in 
relations between Ottawa and London. The 
proposal was for the creation of full-scale 
dominion "fleet units," in essence the creation 
of national navies for the dominions. The 
Laurier government seized on it, and the 
Canadian Navy was born the next year with the 
Naval Service Act of May 1910. But the decision 
had gone against the grain of Admiralty 
thinking. There, the preference had always 
been for one single imperial Navy. These 
attitudes did not go away. Indeed, like the 
German U-Boat raiders whose activities along 
the Canadian coast Hadley and Sarty so 
interestingly reveal elsewhere in the book, these 
attitudes would regularly surface to cause 
anguish and confusion in Ottawa. 
They did so two years later, when a new 
First Lord of the Admiralty took office in London. 
His name was Winston Churchill. The 1909 
Imperial Conference decision, he declared, had 
been a "thoroughly vicious" departure from the 
basic strategic principles of concentration and 
centralised British control. It was too late to do 
much about the Canadian navy, such as it 
was. But when it came to distributing 
intelligence, he was able to ensure that old 
principles held sway. 
Churchill was instrumental in the setting 
up of Room 40, the Admiralty's code-breaking 
centre, and was determined to guard its secrets. 
The result was that after war broke out in 
August 1914, London severely curtailed the 
flow of intelligence to Ottawa and, in particular, 
gave no hint of Room 40's success in breaking 
enemy codes. Partly as a result of this, 
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Lieutenant Richard Stephens, the officer 
responsible for naval intelligence in Ottawa, 
possessed little information about enemy ship 
movements, and had no effective way of 
evaluating the myriad reports that flooded in 
from the United States about German plans for 
seaborne raids on Canadian shipping and 
coastlines. Realistically, this did not make 
much of a difference at the beginning of the 
war. Canada had virtually no local forces to do 
anything to counter German moves anyway. 
Stephens' "blindness" in naval matters 
contrasted strongly with the plentiful 
intelligence about alleged German plots and 
raids that flowed from across the U.S. border. 
For much of this Ottawa depended on Britain, 
especially when it came to information coming 
out of naval attache circles in the American 
capital. But, as Hadley and Sarty stress, 
"Watching the United States was of course an 
ancient and essential Canadian position." As 
during the Fenian era of the 1860s and 1870s, 
the Dominion Police established a network of 
agents across the border. Every wild rumour 
of a German plot came their way, and most of 
them were fantasy. The clarity of intelligence 
was not always helped by the contract signed 
with the Pinkerton agency in New York to 
supplement the work done by Canadian agents. 
As the authors tell the tale, at least one 
Pinkerton man working for Ottawa belonged 
more properly between the pages of Mickey 
Spillane. Having identified a seedy boarding 
house in New York as the possible centre of a 
German spy ring, Pinkerton Operative No.68, 
for example, proceeded to develop a passion for 
its landlady, a Fraulein Seithen. As a result of 
his indiscretions, by 1915 he had blown his 
cover. The Dominion Police sensibly decided 
by this point that most surveillance ofthis kind 
was a waste of time. So had Stephens in naval 
intelligence. There was another source, 
however, that was useful for the navy. This 
was German diplomatic traffic being intercepted 
in the Maritimes. Before the war the Universal 
Radio Syndicate had built a transatlantic 
station at Newcastle, New Brunswick. On the 
Admiralty's advice it was spared the general 
closing down of radio stations on the outbreak 
of war and instead was placed under control of 
the Royal Canadian Navy. It was soon 
intercepting messages between German officials 
in the United States and Berlin, and became a 
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regular source for both Ottawa and London. 
Under U.S. neutrality laws the Germans were 
supposed to transmit only en clair. But under 
the guise of commercial information they 
frequently sent messages containing naval 
information that was easily read. 
No story of Canadian intelligence for the 
early part of this century would be complete 
without the inevitable tug of war between the 
Dominion and London. The Admiralty kept the 
secrets of Room 40, and they also fought with 
Ottawa over the location of the intelligence 
centre for the North Atlantic. Stephens decided 
it should be in Halifax, which made operational 
sense. The Admiralty decided on St. John's, 
Newfoundland. The reason was to ensure 
British control and "avoid friction with the 
Canadian authorities." Predictably, the 
decision only served to create friction as well as 
prompt an outburst of imperial pique when Sir 
Edward Grey protested vehemently to Ottawa 
that the Canadian naval service had broken 
proper lines of imperial communication. As 
Hadley and Sarty demonstrate, convoluted links 
in intelligence-sharing created by political 
sensitivities were to get in the way of rapid and 
efficient decision-making throughout the war. 
Students of the Second World War will note 
this with interest, because the story that Hadley 
and Sarty have to tell makes it clear that many 
of the factors and responses that shaped 
Canada's war effort during 1939-1945 were at 
play between 1914 and 1918. And so far as 
intelligence went, moves towards sovereignty 
were always counter-balanced, and often 
frustrated, by the requirements of the nation's 
senior partners. History does have a tendency 
to repeat itself. 
David Stafford's books include Britain 
and European Resistance 1940-45 and 
Camp X: Canada's School for SecretA gents. 
He was Executive Director of the Cana-
dian Federation of International Mfairs 
until the summer of 1992. He is currently 
at the University of Edinburgh. Dr. Staf-
ford is a Contributing Editor for CMH and 
will also write a regular book review col-
umn. 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 13
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/13
